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Abstract
This paper explores some of the factors that make complex sys-
tems complex. We first examine the history of complex systems. It 
was Aristotle’s insight that how elements are joined together helps 
determine the properties of the resulting whole. We find (a) that 
scientific reductionism does not provide a sufficient explanation; 
(b)  that to understand complex systems, one must identify and 
trace energy flows; and (c) that disproportionate causality, includ-
ing global tipping points, are all around us. Disproportionate cau-
sality results from the wide availability of energy stores. We discuss 
three categories of emergent phenomena—static, dynamic, and 
adaptive—and recommend retiring the term emergent, except per-
haps as a synonym for creative. Finally, we find that virtually all 
communication is stigmergic. 
Keywords: complex systems, reductionism, energy flows, tipping 
points, emergence
In Memoriam
David Pines, co-founder of the Santa Fe Institute, passed away May 3, 
2018. An obituary on the Santa Fe Institute website (2018a) describes him 
as follows.
Pines was a longtime advocate for describing the properties of sys-
tems that arise from the behaviors of their underlying components 
in terms of “emergence.”
He is best known for his contributions to understanding the phe-
nomena that emerge from the complex interactions of the elemen-
tary constituents of matter.
Although I never met him, the numerous warm and admiring remem-
brances make it clear that Professor Pines made significant contributions 
to many fields; his founding and continuing support of the Santa Fe Insti-
tute was just one of them. One can get a sense of him as a person from a 
lecture he gave a year and a half before his death (Pines, 2016). 
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In his honor, this paper includes a number of extracts from his work about 
emergence. I don’t agree with everything he said, but I want to offer an 
additional minor platform for his voice. 
¿Qué hace que los sistemas 
complejos sean complejos?
 
Resumen
Este documento explora algunos de los factores para hacer que los 
sistemas complejos sean complejos. Primero examinamos la histo-
ria de los sistemas complejos. Según Aristóteles, la forma en que se 
unen los elementos ayuda a determinar las propiedades del todo re-
sultante. Encontramos (a) que el reduccionismo científico no pro-
porciona una explicación suficiente; (b) que para comprender siste-
mas complejos, uno debe identificar y rastrear los flujos de energía; 
y (c) esa causalidad desproporcionada, incluidos los puntos de in-
flexión a nivel mundial, nos rodean. La causalidad desproporciona-
da resulta de la amplia disponibilidad de tiendas de energía. Discuti-
mos tres categorías de fenómenos emergentes-estáticos, dinámicos 
y adaptativos-y recomendamos retirar el término emergente, ex-
cepto tal vez como sinónimo de creativo. Finalmente, encontra-
mos que prácticamente todas las comunicaciones son estigmáticas. 
 
Palabras clave: sistemas complejos, reduccionismo, flujos de ener-
gía, puntos de inflexión, emergencia
是什么让复杂系统变得复杂？
摘要
本文探索了一些使复杂系统变得复杂的因素。笔者首先检验
了复杂系统的历史。亚里士多德认为，各种因素的结合方
式帮助确定了起决定作用的因素的性质。笔者发现，（a）
科学还原论没有提供一个充足的解释；（b）为理解复杂系
统，则必须识别并追踪能量流；（c）不成比例的因果关
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系，包括全球临界点，都围绕在人们身边。不成比例的因果
关系是由能量储存的广泛可获得性所导致的。笔者探讨了突
发现象的三种类型——静态、动态和适应，并提出淘汰“突
发”这一术语，转而用创造性代替。笔者结论发现，几乎一
切沟通都具有共识主动性（ stigmergic）。
关键词：复杂系统，还原论，能量流，临界点，突现
1. Introduction
Nearly three and a half decades after the founding of the Santa Fe Institute—year zero for the 
modern study of complex systems—
there is still no widely accepted defini-
tion of what a complex system is. Yet 
interest in the field continues, as evi-
denced by the titles both of this journal 
and of the conference from which the 
papers in this edition sprang. This pa-
per continues the exploration of what 
makes complex systems complex. It 
begins with a brief history of complex 
systems—in Section 2—and then ex-
amines three broad categories of factors 
that contribute to complexity. Section 3 
examines disproportionate causality—
the phenomenon that a spark can start 
a fire. Examples include global (e.g., cli-
mate) tipping points, control systems, 
switches, symbolic causes, and the pre-
requisite to it all, available energy. Sec-
tion 4 returns to what seems like a well-
worn area: emergence. It proposes three 
fairly clean-cut subcategories of emer-
gence, static, dynamic, and adaptive, 
and concludes that adaptive emergence 
is a synonym for the creative process. 
Section 5 suggests that stigmergy char-
acterizes nearly all communication. 
That section highlights the inevitable 
material traces associated with commu-
nication. Section 6 looks back over the 
paper and offers a summary. 
2. A Brief History of the 
Idea of Complex Systems
Quite a few steps were required to flesh 
out the idea of a complex system. 
2.1 Aristotle
Aristotle took one of the earliest. In the 
Metaphysics (350 BCE), he asked what 
it is about an integrated “whole,” what 
we might call a system, that distinguish-
es it from a pile of its parts. His answer 
was that a whole consists of both mat-
ter and design, which he calls form. He 
said that the way a whole’s components 
are organized and joined together con-
tributes both to its properties and to its 
persistence as a unified entity. Over the 
years, this has been compressed to the 
whole is more than the sum of its parts—
i.e., structure and design matter. 
Was this a new insight? Wheels 
with axels were known for five millen-
nia prior to Aristotle (see Gasser, 2003). 
Wheels with axels certainly incorporate 
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design features. And they have proper-
ties their components lack individual-
ly. So the principle that design matters 
was known—at least intuitively—long 
before Aristotle. Yet, an explosion of 
Greek technology occurred in the cen-
tury after Aristotle. Did Aristotle help 
trigger it? I know of no research on that 
question.
2.2  Science, Reductionism, and 
Anti-Reductionism
One can trace the birth of modern sci-
ence, and with it reductionism, to the 
mid-sixteenth century. By the mid-sev-
enteenth century, Hooke (1665) expect-
ed the microscope to show us “all the se-
cret workings of Nature [managed as if] 
by Wheels, and Engines, and Springs.” 
Soon afterwards, Fontenelle (1686) ex-
pressed the common view that “the uni-
verse is like a watch, only bigger.” Yet he 
was skeptical (see letters, 1766) that the 
clockwork universe metaphor extended 
to biology.
Suppose animals are machines. 
When you put Monsieur Dog 
Machine and Mlle. Dog Machine 
together, soon you have lit-
tle Puppy Machines. But two 
Watches might lie together all 
their lives without ever produc-
ing a puppy watch. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, 
Mill (1843, Bk. III, Ch.6, §1) was more 
direct.
The phenomena of life bear no 
analogy to any of the effects 
produced by the components of 
the body considered as physical 
agents. No mere summing up 
of the separate actions of its el-
ements will ever amount to the 
action of the living body itself.
2.3  British Emergentists
In the early twentieth century, British 
emergentists postulated that the world 
is divided into discrete strata ar-
ranged in order of increasing ... 
complexity. Fundamental phys-
ics is the base level, followed 
by chemistry, biology, and psy-
chology (and possibly sociolo-
gy). To each level corresponds a 
special science, whose task is to 
elucidate [the laws of] that level. 
—O’Connor (2015)
In other words, nature builds up-
wards by developing coherent and in-
ternally consistent levels. 
The emergentists picture of a 
multi-layered world is more relevant 
than they imagined. Computational 
systems are indeed developed along 
these lines. The lowest level consists of 
programs written in the language of the 
bare computer. Operating systems, e.g., 
Window, Unix, MacOS, and higher lev-
el programming languages follow until 
we reach user applications. 
Modern technology also fits the 
emergentist mold. The cell phone in-
corporates devices that depend on an 
enormous number of technologies. 
A flaw in the emergentist vision is 
that the levels are not a strict hierarchy. 
For example, the bacterium Ideonella 
sakaiensis lives on Polyethylene tere-
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phthalate  (PET), the primary material 
used in the manufacture of single-use 
plastic beverage bottles (Yoshida et al., 
2016). 
2.4  General System1 Theory, 
Autopoiesis, and Dissipative 
Structures
Schrödinger (1944) and then Von Ber-
talanffy (1968) added another insight: 
the importance of open systems and the 
importation of energy. 
In What is life (1944) Schröding-
er wrote the following.
The device by which an organ-
ism maintains itself stationary at 
a fairly high level of orderliness 
... consists in continually sucking 
orderliness from its environment. 
Von Bertalanffy (1968) elaborat-
ed and extended this idea. 
Living systems are open systems, 
maintaining themselves in ex-
change of materials with envi-
ronment, and in a continuous 
building up and breaking down 
of their components. ... 
But in an open system, and es-
pecially in a living organism, not 
only is there entropy production 
owing to irreversible processes, 
but the organism feeds, to use 
an expression of Schrödinger’s, 
from negative entropy, import-
ing complex organic molecules, 
using their energy, and rendering 
back the simpler end products to 
1 One often sees both General System Theory and General Systems Theory. Von Bertalanffy favored 
the singular, but he didn’t object to the plural.
the environment. Thus, living 
systems, [maintain] themselves 
in a steady state by the impor-
tation of materials rich in free 
energy.
Arguably, von Bertalanffy was 
the first to take the next step. He asked 
what, if anything, do self-sustaining en-
tities have in common? This led him to 
General System Theory (1972). 
Originally von Bertalanffy fo-
cused on biological systems. As early as 
1928 he wrote, 
Since the fundamental character 
of the living thing is its organiza-
tion, the customary investigation 
of the single parts and processes 
cannot provide a complete ex-
planation of the vital phenom-
ena. The chief task of biology 
must be to discover the laws of 
biological systems (at all levels of 
organization).
One can characterize General 
System Theory as an attempt to give 
Aristotle’s notion of a form a scientific 
footing. What organizing principles en-
able systems to survive and function?
Work in the field blossomed after 
World War II. von Bertalanffy (1949–
1951) wrote that one must maintain a 
system-level view while not giving in to 
the mysticism of holism. 
Biology, psychology, sociology 
and other sciences generally ac-
knowledge the central position of 
the concept of wholeness. What 
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is meant by this concept is in-
dicated by expressions such as 
system, gestalt, organism, inter-
action, the whole is more than 
the sum of its parts, and the like. 
These concepts have often been 
misused and are of a vague and 
somewhat mystical character. 
General System Theory attempts 
to formulate these concepts in an 
exact language. 
Soon, others began publishing in 
the field. Attempting to integrate gener-
al system theory with the then-popular 
quasi-discipline of cybernetics, Ash-
by (1957), wrote:
Cybernetics offers a method for 
the scientific treatment of sys-
tems in which [a system’s very 
complexity] is too important to 
be ignored. 
Rapoport and Horvath (1959) 
proposed the notion of “organized com-
plexity,” situated between “organized 
simplicity” and “chaotic complexity”—
anticipating the notion of complexity 
as residing at the edge of chaos. Simon 
(1962) proposed an early definition of 
complex system.
A complex system consists of a 
large number of parts that inter-
act in a non-simple way. In such 
systems, the whole is more than 
the sum of the parts, not in an 
ultimate, metaphysical sense, but 
in the important pragmatic sense 
that, given the properties of the 
parts and the laws of their inter-
action, it is not a trivial matter to 
infer the properties of the whole. 
In the face of complexity, an 
in-principle reductionist may 
be at the same time a pragmatic 
holist. 
Schrödinger (1944) asked about 
linking physics and chemistry to biol-
ogy.
Present-day physics and chemis-
try cannot account for what hap-
pens within a living organism. 
All atoms are constantly in mo-
tion due to heat. Any lawfulness 
and orderliness that one might 
think of is made inoperative by 
the unceasing heat motion. 
How much heat motion? Hoff-
mann (2012, p. 145) compares it to a car 
in a windstorm.
Every molecular machine in 
our bodies is hit by a fast-mov-
ing water molecule about every 
10-13 seconds. [The] power in-
put from the random pounding 
of water molecules is a hundred 
million times larger than the 
power output of our machines! 
[For a windstorm to have the 
same effect on a car,] the storm 
would need a wind speed of an 
astounding seventy thousand 
miles per hour! 
To defend against such disorder, 
biological organisms continually re-
build and repair themselves. In a review 
of Maturana and Varela’s (1980) auto-
poiesis, Luisi (2003) argued that all bi-
ological organisms have “a semiperme-
able chemical boundary within which 
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they are capable of self-maintenance 
by self-generation of their components 
from within.” 
Although the term autopoiesis 
has been dismissed as lacking scientific 
rigor, it may be understood to refer to 
such self-maintenance activities. Gen-
eralizing further, social systems—i.e., 
groupings of living organisms such as 
families, packs, corporations, countries, 
etc.—also hold themselves together. 
For social systems autopoiesis may be 
understood as self-maintenance with-
in a self-created social boundary (Lui-
si, 2014). The boundary may consist of 
means to determine whether an entity 
belongs to an organization—e.g., dis-
tinctive markings or odor. 
Somewhat more controversially, 
Prigogine developed and popularized 
the notion of dissipative structures. 
Typically, a dissipative structure devel-
ops in systems of partially constrained 
materials through which energy is 
pumped. Prigogine’s idea was that sys-
tems that remain in a steady state but 
far from equilibrium develop internal 
structures as a way to dissipate the en-
ergy that flows through them. His  “Ex-
ploring Complexity” (1987) lays out his 
overall perspective.
[We] are obliged to acknowl-
edge the existence of stochastic 
processes if we want to avoid the 
paradox of referring the variety 
of natural phenomena to a pro-
gram printed at the moment of 
the Big Bang. ...
It appears now that the gap be-
tween “simple” and “complex,” 
between “disorder” and “order” 
is narrower than it was thought 
before. Complexity is no lon-
ger limited to biology or hu-
man sciences: It is invading the 
physical sciences and appears 
deeply rooted in the laws of na-
ture. The basic characteristics of 
complexity are irreversibility and 
stochasticity. 
For a long time, the interest of 
thermodynamics concentrated 
on isolated systems at equilibri-
um. Today, interest has shifted 
to non-equilibrium, to systems 
interacting with their surround-
ings through an entropy flow. 
This interaction means that we 
are dealing with “embedded” 
systems [such as] towns or living 
systems, which can only survive 
because of their embedding in 
their environment. 
There is [a] basic difference with 
classical mechanics in which the 
world appears as a museum that 
conserves everything, including 
information. The world of ther-
modynamics is a world of pro-
cesses, destroying and creating 
information. Think of the evo-
lution of temperature, the inho-
mogeneity of which disappears 
without leaving any trace.
Prigogine is known in some cir-
cles as “the poet of thermodynamics.” 
He was awarded the 1977 Nobel Prize 
in Chemistry “for his contributions 
to non-equilibrium thermodynamics, 
particularly the theory of dissipative 
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structures.” Yet Anderson and Stein 
(1987) argue that
dissipative structures in real, 
physical, open systems uncon-
strained by artificial boundaries 
will be chaotic and unstable and 
are not well suited for the produc-
tion of stable emergent activity.
Another concern is that biologi-
cal organisms “choose” when and how 
to import and use energy. Dissipative 
structures make no such “choices.” En-
ergy is pushed through them. 
2.5  Agents and Evolutionary 
Processes
The goal of understanding complex sys-
tems remained elusive. Little progress 
was made until 1984 when the found-
ing of the Santa Fe Institute re-ener-
gized the field (see German, 2018). 
Figure 1. Frequency of appearance of complex adaptive system in published books. 
The vertical axis shows the percentage of books in which the term appears—start-
ing at 0%. The raw numbers are not of interest. What matters are the relative values. 
The Ngram search looked for complex adaptive systems. The term complex system is 
so generic that it appears in contexts that are not about the sorts of complex systems 
we are discussing.
 
Figure 1 shows a Google Ngram 
plot of the appearances of complex 
adaptive system in published books. An 
early peak appears two years after von 
Bertalanffy’s summary work (1968) fol-
lowed by a rebirth due to the Santa Fe 
Institute (SFI). Ngram data goes only 
through 2008. Manual searches suggest 
that usage continued to grow through 
2012 but has since declined. 
The Santa Fe Institute created an 
interest in adaptation, and more gen-
erally in evolutionary processes. John 
Holland’s genetic algorithm (1975, 
1992) lays out a straightforward ap-
proach to applying the insights of evo-
lution to a wide range of problems. The 
genetic algorithm and its derivatives 
have become widely-used approach-
es to problems with very large search 
spaces, and Holland’s ideas were incor-
porated into the SFI view of complex 
adaptive systems.
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Viewing complex systems 
through an evolutionary lens brings in-
sight to phenomena that are otherwise 
difficult to understand. Arthur explains 
(2015a, 2015b) how an evolutionary 
perspective changes the way one thinks 
about economics. 
The behaviors of individu-
al agents produce system-level 
patterns. The agents respond to 
those patterns by altering their 
individual behaviors. The altered 
behaviors produce changed pat-
terns, etc. We need to see social 
and economic systems ... as a 
web of incentives that always in-
duce further behavior.
One of the best known agent-
based example is Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Two agents chose, privately, whether 
to cooperate with or to defect on each 
other. The payoffs are so arranged that 
mutual defection leads to meager but 
positive results for both agents. Mutu-
al cooperation produces better results 
for both agents. The catch is that if one 
agent cooperates and the other defects, 
the cooperator does worse than mutual 
defection while the defector does better 
than mutual cooperation. In such an 
environment defection is the only ra-
tional choice.
In what is known as Iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, agents interact 
multiple times. The best possible result 
would be achieved by an agent that re-
peatedly defects against a continually 
cooperating partner. But in environ-
ments in which such “sucker” partners 
are eliminated by evolutionary pressure, 
always-defect is not an effective long 
term strategy. The best feasible strategy 
is for agents to cooperate with cooper-
ating partners—even though there is no 
mechanism for making promises about 
future behavior.
2.6  Review So Far
So far, we have seen complex systems 
come into focus in a number of ways.
1. Aristotle observed that a system has 
different properties from an aggre-
gation of its components. This typi-
cally occurs when component orga-
nization makes a difference.
2. Mill and others observed that even 
when components are put together 
in well thought-out ways, it seems 
unlikely that one can construct a 
living system.
3. The British emergentists suggested 
thinking in terms of layers in which 
higher levels are developed from el-
ements of lower levels.
4. Schrödinger, von Bertalanffy, Mat-
urana, and Prigogine observed that 
biological organisms—and hence 
complex systems in general—must 
be open to their surroundings. They 
import energy and materials and 
export waste energy and materials. 
5. The Santa Fe Institute added a focus 
on agents and adaptation. Systems 
consist of individual agents, each 
of which is capable of pursuing its 
own ends. The combination of these 
individual activities produces mac-
ro-scale patterns. Agents may ob-
serve the patterns they created and 
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modify their behavior to achieve 
better results. Such adaptations may 
change the macro patterns, leading 
to further adaptations, etc. 
Even given these insights, most 
complexity scholars agree that there is 
no standard definition for a complex 
system. But many mutually consistent 
characterizations—if not definitions—
have been proposed. Recent character-
izations follow Simon’s lead. A complex 
system consists of:
•	 large networks of components, 
lacking central control, that give 
rise to complex collective behavior 
by following simple rules of opera-
tions.—Mitchell (2009)
•	 many interacting parts whose col-
lective behavior is more than the 
sum of the individual behaviors.—
Newman (2011)
•	 an ensemble of many elements, 
which are interacting in a disor-
dered way, resulting in robust orga-
nization and memory.—Ladyman, 
Lambert, and Wiesner (2013)
•	 a number of components that inter-
act in such a way that it is difficult 
to determine, ex ante, by simply 
concentrating on the components, 
what the aggregate behavior of the 
overall system will be.—Axtell et al. 
(2016)
•	 many interacting parts that produce 
collective behaviors that exceed and 
even transcend the capabilities of 
the constituents.—Center for the 
Study of Complex Systems, U. Mich. 
(2017) 
•	 systems in which many agents in-
teract and adapt to one another 
and their environments. These in-
teractions and adaptations result 
in evolutionary processes and often 
surprising “emergent” behaviors at 
the macro level.—Santa Fe Institute 
website (2018b)
Common to the above is the 
observation that when many elements 
interact the result is often not easily 
predictable. One contributing factor, 
known as disproportionate causality, 
involves situations in which a system’s 
response to a stimulus dwarfs the stim-
ulus itself. Section 3 explores this area. 
Section 4 discusses emergence, interac-
tions among many elements that pro-
duce macro patterns. Section 5 gen-
eralizes the notion of stigmergy, i.e., 
communication through traces left in 
the environment. Each contributes to 
complexity in its own way. 
3. Disproportionate Causality
Poli (2017) suggests a “golden rule” for distinguishing between (a)  complex problems and sys-
tems and (b) problems and systems that 
are merely complicated. 
Complicated problems [and sys- 
tems] originate from causes 
that can be individually disting- 
uished; ... for each input to the 
system there is a proportionate 
output. ... On the other hand, 
complex problems and systems 
result from networks of mul-
tiple interacting causes that 
cannot be individually distin-
guished; ... small inputs may 
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result in disproportionate effects. 
[Emphasis added]
This section discusses three cat-
egories of disproportionate causality: 
tipping points, switches, and symbolic 
effects. It also discusses the enabling 
mechanism: energy storage and acces-
sibility. 
3.1  Macro Tipping Points
Lamberson and Page (2012) define a 
tipping point as “a discontinuity be-
tween current and future states of a sys-
tem.”
A direct tip occurs when a grad-
ual change in the value of a vari-
able leads to a [discontinuous] 
jump in that same variable in the 
future. A contextual tip occurs 
when a gradual change in one 
variable leads to a discontinuous 
jump in another. 
The Fire Model (Wilensky, 1997) 
packaged with NetLogo (Wilensky, 
1999) explores the effect of tree density 
on the spread of fires. If a fire starts at 
the left edge of the forest (see Figure 2), 
how much of the forest will it destroy?
Figure 2. The NetLogo Fire Model.
The NetLogo Behavior Space ex-
ploration tool allows one to run a mod-
el with different values of the driving 
variables—density in this case. When 
applied to the Fire Model, the tool pro-
duced the results in Figure 2. There is a 
contextual tipping point between densi-
ty values 59 and 60. 
Tipping points frequently mark 
a boundary between attractor states. 
The attractors in the fire model are 
(a) the fire burns out relatively quickly 
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and (b) the fire spreads to most of the 
forest. 
Climate change is pushing the 
world toward a catastrophic tipping 
point (Spooner, 2018).
The [Atlantic meridional over-
turning circulation (AMOC)] is 
like a giant conveyor belt of wa-
ter. It transports warm, salty wa-
ter to the north Atlantic where it 
gets very cold and sinks. Once in 
the deep ocean the water flows 
back southwards and then all 
around the world’s oceans. This 
conveyor belt includes the Gulf 
Stream and is one of the most 
important transporters of heat in 
the climate system.
Caesar, Rahmstorf, Robinson, 
Feulner, and Saba (2018) reports on re-
cent findings.
[The AMOC] is a highly non-
linear system with a critical 
threshold. ... In recent years the 
AMOC appears to have reached 
a record low, [an unprecedented 
event in the past millennium]. ... 
Continued global warming is 
likely to further weaken the 
AMOC, via changes to the hy-
drological cycle, sea-ice loss, 
and accelerated melting of the 
Greenland Ice Sheet.
Rahmstorf, one of the investiga-
tors, explains the concern (Carrington, 
2018).
We don’t know where [the 
AMOC] tipping point is and 
should avoid disrupting it at all 
costs. 
To conclude this section, I would 
like to discuss a case in which the viola-
tion of a tipping point was at least part-
ly corrected. During the early-twenti-
eth-century wolves were eliminated from 
Yellowstone park. As reported by Kuhne 
(2018) their disappearance allowed the 
elk population to explode. Since elk 
browse on willows, the additional elk re-
duced the number of willows, the food 
source for the beaver, causing those ani-
mal to abandon smaller streams. 
The loss of beaver ponds ... 
lowered water tables and com-
pressed the area of bare, moist 
substrate needed for willow es-
tablishment. ... Thus, the loss of 
wolves ... caused multiple chang-
es in the ecosystem’s biological 
and physical processes, creating 
an alternative state where herba-
ceous vegetation dominated ri-
parian corridors, where willows 
were predominately sparse in 
distribution and short in stature, 
and where beaver, once abun-
dant, were absent.—Marshall, 
Thompson Hobbs, and Cooper 
(2013)
In 1995 and 1996, 31 Canadian 
wolves were reintroduced to Yellow-
stone (Phillips & Smith, 1997). During 
the following decade, the wolf popula-
tion shot up to about 170 and then de-
clined to about 100. During the same 
period, the elk population declined 
from about 19,000 to about 5,000. These 
are now stable and sustainable popu-
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lations (Smith et al., 2016). However, 
the prior elimination of the wolves had 
pushed the system into a different at-
tractor, which turned out to be resilient 
(strange use of that word in this con-
text) to wolf restoration. Beavers have 
not returned to their previous popula-
tion level, and willows are not as tall as 
they were before wolves were eliminat-
ed (Marshall et al., 2013). So this story 
is only a partial success.
3.2  Everyday Tipping Points: 
Switches and Other Control 
Mechanisms
If the tipping points discussed above 
represent dramatic ecological transi-
tions, the world familiar to most peo-
ple includes many quotidian tipping 
points. The triggering of these familiar 
tipping points is essential both to our 
survival as biological organisms and to 
the smooth running of society. They all 
reflect disproportionate causality. This 
section examines some familiar exam-
ples of disproportionate causality: con-
trol systems and switches. 
A control system allows one to 
control the operation of a device or pro-
cess through the expenditure of mini-
mal amounts of energy. Think of a car 
with power steering. Turn the steering 
wheel, and the car changes direction. 
Consider how much energy would be 
required to change a car’s direction if 
the only option were the application of 
a force to one side or another. So a car 
with power steering produces a signif-
icant effect with minimal causal input.
Gene switches provide an inter-
esting example of a control system in 
nature. Briefly, genes are sequences of 
DNA that code (indirectly) for proteins. 
To produce the protein associated with 
a gene, RNA polymerase binds to the 
DNA at a location known as a promot-
er, which is near the start of the gene. 
It then transcribes the gene to produce 
messenger-RNA (mRNA), which is de-
coded by ribosomes to produce the as-
sociated protein.
Between each promoter and the 
gene sits another sequence of DNA 
known as an operator. When a repres-
sor binds to an operator it blocks RNA 
polymerase from transcribing the ge-
netic DNA and switches off the produc-
tion of the protein. This is a gene switch.
Gene switches are vital to biolog-
ical organisms. They provide a means 
for organs to manufacture the proteins 
needed for their own functioning and 
make it possible for some cells to be-
come eyes while others become feet. 
Perhaps an even more striking 
example of disproportionate causality is 
the everyday switch. Imagine a switch 
that controls, say, an electric light. Turn 
the switch to the on setting, and the light 
goes on; turn it to the off setting, and 
the light goes off. The amount of energy 
required to move the switch from on to 
off can be minimal. Yet the effect can be 
arbitrarily large, depending on what the 
switch controls. The switch is the pro-
totypical example of disproportionate 
causality. 
Of course switches are also im-
portant in another context: computing. 
The transistor is essentially a switch. 
In computing, switches matter not be-
cause of their disproportionality effect 
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but because they can be organized to 
control each other.
3.3  Sources of Easily Accessible 
Energy
Switches involve two energy sources. 
One flips the switch; the other is the en-
ergy flow the switch controls. Switches 
can exist only if there are such energy 
flows.
To explain energy flows, we start 
with a brief overview of our planetary 
energy flows. The earth as a whole is an 
open system. It receives energy from the 
sun. Most of the energy used on earth is 
solar energy captured via photosynthe-
sis. The average rate of energy capture 
by photosynthesis is about three times 
the power consumption of civilization. 
Besides energy captured by pho-
tosynthesis, we capture solar energy in 
the form of wind energy, hydroelectric 
energy, and biomass energy. We also 
capture solar energy with solar technol-
ogies. Non-solar energy sources include 
geothermal energy and wave and tidal 
energy. 
Whatever its source, energy is 
generally stored before it is used. Ener-
gy captured by photosynthesis is stored 
initially as glucose. Energy from other 
sources is either already stored, e.g., as 
fossil fuels, or is stored in other ways. 
To be useful, an energy store must re-
lease energy on demand. By definition, 
an easily tapped store of energy can re-
lease more energy than is required to 
trigger it and represents potential dis-
proportionate causality. 
Triggering mechanisms make en-
ergy stores possible. Without a trigger-
ing mechanism, a putative energy store 
would release its energy spontaneous-
ly—and would not be a useful store. 
In short, energy is received from 
the sun and converted to more sta-
ble forms for storage. Stored energy 
is accessed and released as needed for 
life processes or for other uses such as 
transportation, manufacturing, house-
hold needs, computation, etc.
We live in a world with myriad 
energy stores. Each biological organ-
ism, human beings included, is such a 
store. Technology provides others such 
as batteries and fuels. 
The existence of many energy 
stores creates the possibility of chain 
reactions. Explosion chain reactions 
of are all too familiar—and we do our 
best to protect against them. But we are 
less successful controlling other chain 
reactions. Examples include a crowd 
becoming a mob, an online message 
“going viral,” a style becoming a fad, or 
public opinion swinging to a “strong-
man” in response to a terrorist threat. 
Governmental structures, such as a 
constitution and separation of powers, 
help throttle such chain reactions. But 
they do not always succeed. Systems 
with many easily tapped stores of ener-
gy are of necessity less stable and more 
complex. 
3.4  Symbolic Causes and 
Autonomous Causality
The preceding sections discussed dis-
proportionate causality in situations in 
which the cause was perhaps physically 
quite small. This section explores sym-
bolic causality. 
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Pearl (2000) and Woodward 
(2003) independently defined what is 
called interventionist causality, a for-
malization of the intuition that if wig-
gling X results in Y wiggling, then X has 
a causal relationship to Y. Unlike phys-
ical causality (Dowe, 2000)—in which 
a physical quantity, such as momen-
tum, is transferred from cause to effect 
(think one billiard ball hitting anoth-
er)—interventionist causality does not 
require such a transfer. Consider our 
light switch example. The causal mech-
anism is clear—a switch controls an en-
ergy flow—but no physical quantity is 
transmitted from the agent that flipped 
the switch to the light. 
Symbolic causes are even further 
removed from direct physical causality. 
A traffic light changing color causes cars 
to start/stop. The color change is a sym-
bolic cause. 
Following are the primary prop-
erties of symbols.
i. Symbols are abstract, and by defini-
tion, causally inefficacious (Rosen, 
2014).
ii. Symbols have no intrinsic prop-
erties. Interchanging symbols in a 
mathematical or logical argument 
has no formal consequences. 
iii. A symbol’s only property is that it 
can be distinguished from other 
symbols. 
How can an abstract and caus-
ally inefficacious symbol be a cause? A 
symbol produces an effect only when 
the element on the “effect side” of the 
relationship attaches a meaning to the 
symbol—e.g., a car’s driver attaches 
a meaning to a traffic light’s color. To 
connect a symbolic cause to a physical 
effect requires an interpreter to trans-
form a symbol into physical action. 
The agent that responds to the symbol 
determines the effect. I call this autono-
mous causation (Abbott, 2018).
Notice how extraordinary this is. 
Laplace (1814) famously wrote (empha-
sis added),
The present state of the universe 
is the effect of its past and the 
cause of its future.
Laplace was talking about the laws 
of physics. Laplacian causality leaves no 
room for symbolic causes: you don’t ex-
pect a rock to respond to a traffic light. 
Instead of the laws of physics pushing 
the world around, autonomous agents 
“choose” how to respond to symbols. 
This doesn’t negate the laws of 
physics. It simply establishes two sourc-
es of causation. For example, walking 
uphill involves both the force of grav-
ity and a decision to walk against that 
force. This sort of two-pronged causali-
ty typifies autonomy. 
Nor is it an argument for dual-
ism. It is a recognition that the forces at 
play in the informational world are typ-
ically small compared to those at play in 
the physical world.
When a driver, human or auton-
omous, sees a traffic light, she (it) con-
verts the photons to a symbol: RedLight 
or GreenLight. She (it) responds to that 
symbol by pressing the brake or acceler-
ator, which causes her (its) vehicle to act 
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in the world. In purely physical terms, 
the photons from the light caused the 
car to stop or go—an extreme case of 
disproportionate causality.
Dual causality makes unraveling 
the causes of an autonomous agents’ ac-
tions potentially quite difficult. What do 
we know about how an agent will choose 
to behave? In the case of human agents, 
we may not know very much. A person’s 
response to a symbol depends on both 
her inborn decision-making processes 
and how experience, including school-
ing, modified those decision-making 
processes. Without a person’s history, 
her response to a symbol may be undis-
coverable except by giving her the sym-
bol and watching what she does. 
Notice how different this is from 
physical causality. When one object 
is struck by another, the struck object 
receives transmitted momentum and 
reacts as expected. It has no choice in 
the matter. When an agent is “struck” 
by a symbol it is up to the agent how 
to respond. (Not stopping at a red light 
has consequences, but it is still up to the 
agent.)
Even knowing an agent’s deci-
sion-making processes doesn’t neces-
sarily mean that one knows how the 
agent will behave. Consider AlphaGo, 
the computer program that beat the 
world Go champion (Moyer, 2016; Sil-
ver et al., 2016.) We know exactly how it 
was programed, how it was trained, and 
the process it uses to select a move. Yet 
no one is able to predict its moves ex-
cept by running the program. After all, 
it picks better moves than anyone else.
The lesson is that difficult as it 
may be to predict the behavior of some 
physical systems—because of chaos, at-
tractors, tipping points, etc.—predict-
ing the behavior of autonomous agents 
is more difficult still. Systems that in-
clude interactions among autonomous 
agents are often quite resistant to pre-
dictions about how they will play out. 
4. Emergence
So far we have examined the history of complex systems and how dis-proportionate causality contrib-
utes to complexity. This section looks at 
phenomena often labeled emergent.
There tend to be two lines of 
thought about how broad a view to take 
of emergence. 
4.1  Emergence Involves 
Autonomous Agents
This perspective focuses on autono-
mous agents and their interactions. 
Refer back to the characterizations of 
complex systems at the end of Section 
2. In those and similar examples, the 
agents are typically either humans or 
biological organisms—as, for example, 
in flocking. They are considered auton-
omous because each agent determines 
for itself how it will act. It makes that 
determination based on its environ-
ment and on the actions of its neigh-
bors. Autonomy is understood as the 
ability of an agent to decide for itself 
how to act: it is self-governing.
4.2  Emergence Includes the 
Interaction of Entities in Purely 
Non-Symbolic Ways
An alternative is to take a broader view. 
Recall the Santa Fe Institute obituary 
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for David Pines. For Pines emergence 
does not require autonomous agents. 
Interacting elementary particles may 
produce emergence. Pines (2014) elab-
orated his position.
When electrons or atoms or indi-
viduals or societies interact with 
one another or their environ-
ment, the collective behavior of 
the whole is different from that of 
its parts. We call this resulting be-
havior emergent. Emergence thus 
refers to collective phenomena 
or behaviors in complex adaptive 
systems that are not present in 
their individual parts. [emphasis 
added]
Examples of emergent behav-
ior are everywhere, from birds 
flocking, fireflies synchronizing, 
ants colonizing, fish schooling, 
individuals self-organizing into 
neighborhoods in cities—all with 
no leaders or central control—to 
the Big Bang, the formation of gal-
axies and stars and planets, the 
evolution of life on earth from 
its origins until now, the fold-
ing of proteins, the assembly of 
cells, the crystallization of atoms 
in a liquid, the superconductivity 
of electrons in some metals, the 
changing global climate, or the 
development of consciousness in 
an infant. [emphasis added]
O’Connor (2015) sketches a sim-
ilarly broad position.
Emergence is a notorious philo-
sophical term of art. ... We might 
roughly characterize the shared 
meaning thus: emergent entities 
(properties or substances) “arise” 
out of more fundamental entities 
and yet are “novel” or “irreduc-
ible” with respect to them. 
Anderson also takes a broad view 
of emergence. In his celebrated “More is 
Different” (1972), he applies the notion 
of emergence, if not the word itself, to 
elementary particles.
The behavior of large and com-
plex aggregates of elementary 
particles ... is not to be under-
stood in terms of a simple ex-
trapolation of the properties of 
a few particles. Instead, at each 
level of complexity, entirely new 
properties appear. ... The whole 
becomes not merely more, but 
very different from the sum of its 
parts. [emphasis added]
Also with elementary particles 
in mind, Stein and Newman (2013) as-
sociate emergence with behaviors such 
as phase transitions, which are not pre-
dictable at the level of individual par-
ticles. They note in addition that since 
salt is not a complex system but does 
exhibit this sort of abrupt phase transi-
tion, emergence is not confined to com-
plex systems.
4.3  Reconciling These Perspectives 
These perspectives can be reconciled 
by generalizing the notion of autono-
my. Barandiaran, Di Paolo, and Rohde 
(2009) define agent in a way that allows 
a bacterium to be an agent.
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An agent is an autonomous or-
ganization capable of adaptively 
regulating its coupling with the 
environment according to the 
norms established by its own vi-
ability conditions.
I suggest a similar definition but 
without the viability conditions. To ex-
plain, I’ll first present a cartoon version 
of spin glasses (adapted from Stein and 
Newman). 
Imagine a surface in which tops 
are fixed to the corners of a square. Each 
top may set its spin to be either clock-
wise or counter-clockwise. In Figure 3, 
three of the tops are spinning clockwise. 
The spin of the fourth is shown as un-
known. If this were a simulation, each 
top would be able to set (or reverse) its 
spin once each time step. 
Suppose the surface imposes 
constraints requiring some spins to 
align, indicated by the = sign, and some 
to be opposite each other, which I’ll call 
anti-align, indicated by the ≠ sign. In 
Figure 3, three of the spins (top left, top 
right, and bottom right) must align. 
Given these constraints, there is 
no way for the lower left top to select a 
spin that will satisfy all the constraints. 
The problem is that it must align with 
the lower right top and anti-align with 
the top at the upper left. But the tops at 
the lower right and upper left must each 
align with the top at the upper right, 
which requires that they align with each 
other. So this set of constraints cannot 
all be satisfied at once. That’s true even 
if some or all of the tops flip their spins.
How does this relate to auton-
omy? Each top is autonomous in the 
sense that it has a choice—in some 
sense—about whether to spin clockwise 
or counter-clockwise. 
Certainly this is a minimal level 
of autonomy. But it’s not very different 
from the level of autonomy of flocking 
boids (Reynolds, 1987). Each boid has 
the ability to change its velocity by a 
small amount at each time step. That 
level of autonomy seems comparable to 
the ability to flip one’s spin. So although 
each top represents a relatively primi-
tive physical entity, it has sufficient au-
tonomy to adjust its coupling with its 
environment.
The same holds for other ex-
amples in which interactions among 
relatively elementary entities produce 
emergent results. Although the entities 
may be limited in their capabilities, each 
couples with its environment according 
to internal rules, which it follows inde-
pendently. These internal self-directing 
rules make these entities self-govern-
ing, i.e., autonomous. 
Spin glasses are relevant to the 
study of complex systems in that, among 
other things, complex systems tend to 
have partially incompatible constraints. 
When a constraint prompts one ele-
Figure 3. A cartoon spin glass example.
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ment to modify how it relates to its en-
vironment, that change may lead some 
of its neighbors to change, which may 
lead some of their neighbors to change, 
etc., producing a cascade of changes 
that may ripple across the entire system. 
Effects of this sort appear in flocking. 
When one boid changes course to avoid 
an obstacle, others act in response, etc. 
Such effects also appear in Schelling’s 
famous segregation model (1971) and 
elsewhere. 
The conclusion is that autonomy 
requires little beyond a certain level of 
internally-driven rule-based behavior. 
Complex interactions may occur when 
even simple autonomous entities inter-
act. With this broader view of autono-
my, the two versions of emergence no 
longer conflict.
4.4  Static Emergence
Given Pines’ view of emergence—in 
which every galaxy, every solar sys-
tem, every chemical compound, every 
biological organism, every ecological 
system, every social organization, and 
every engineered object is emergent—
does the term have any meaning left? 
Abbott (2015) concluded that given its 
burden of intellectual baggage there is 
little reason to continue to use it. Yet, 
the term retains a useful sense. To get 
at it, this section and the following two 
examine three categories of emergence: 
static, dynamic, and adaptive.
Static emergence involves the 
transformation of one or more physical 
things into one or more products. Static 
emergence occurs both in nature and 
as a result of human effort. Examples 
include the transformation of sodium 
and chlorine to salt (natural) and the 
construction of most engineered arti-
facts (human). Static emergence tends 
to occur over a defined and limited time 
span, which is typically short compared 
to the lifetime of the resulting product. 
In most static emergent processes, our 
interest centers on the products pro-
duced. For example, Markvicka, Bart-
lett, Huang, and Majidi (2018) report 
on the development of self-healing 
electronic materials. 
In some important cases, though, 
the focus is on energy. Static emergence 
is usually exergonic: energy is released. 
But photosynthesis, also a form of stat-
ic emergence, is endergonic: energy is 
captured. Two other energy-related 
instances of static emergence are also 
central to modern civilization. The en-
ergy that photosynthesis captures is 
produced on the sun through hydrogen 
fusion, a static emergent process which 
converts hydrogen to helium. That con-
version releases enormous amounts of 
energy, which we experience as sun-
shine. Were it not for that static emer-
gent solar process, photosynthesis 
would have no energy to capture. 
A second class of exergonic static 
emergent processes are those through 
which we generate energy for ourselves: 
nuclear fission and the combustion of 
fossil fuels. In both cases, we are in-
terested in the energy, but the (by-)
products create problems. Some of the 
products of nuclear fission remain ra-
dioactive for many years. Combustion 
of fossil fuels produces carbon dioxide, 
which contributes to global warming. 
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A process may be exergonic 
overall even though some of its prod-
ucts store energy. The sequence of re-
actions that converts ADP to ATP, life’s 
energy currency, is exergonic. But ATP, 
which results from adding a phosphate 
group to ADP, has more energy than 
the ADP and phosphate group from 
which it is constructed. The additional 
energy comes from glucose, which is 
broken down. More energy is released 
from glucose than is stored in ATP. 
Static emergence produces many 
important products: materials (old and 
new), chemical compounds (including 
medicines), and engineered artifacts. It 
also produces the energy that powers 
both life on earth and human civiliza-
tion. In the bigger picture, static emer-
gence creates solar systems and galaxies 
along with the heavier elements, which 
are produced in stars. 
I find it not useful to apply the 
term emergence to these processes. 
They are fairly well understood and 
don’t need the mystification that the 
term emergence adds.
4.5  Dynamic Emergence
Dynamic emergence involves a con-
tinuing process that creates—and more 
importantly maintains—an ongoing 
entity. Like static emergence, dynamic 
emergence occurs both in nature and 
through human effort. Because main-
tenance requires a continuing supply of 
energy and materials, dynamic emer-
gence must involve open systems. 
Non-biological examples include 
the earth’s weather system and its global 
network of ocean currents. In these cas-
es, energy from the sun, but no materi-
als, is imported. Biological examples in-
clude every biological organism as well 
as biological collectives such as packs, 
flocks, families, clans, ant and bee colo-
nies, tribes, and ecologies. 
One can construct an strikingly 
long list of social examples. The con-
ceptually simpler cases include geopo-
litical entities such as neighborhoods, 
villages, towns, cities, countries, mili-
tary and trade alliances (such as NATO 
and NAFTA), and supra-national orga-
nizations (such as the European Union, 
the World Trade Alliance, the World 
Court, and the United Nations). 
Other familiar examples include 
businesses, universities, academic orga-
nizations (such as the Computational 
Social Science Society of the Americas), 
ongoing publications (ranging from 
Paul Krugman’s regular column in the 
New York Times to the Journal for Poli-
cy and Complex Systems), and religious 
organizations (ranging from the local to 
the transnational). 
Other examples include clubs 
(such as private golf clubs and bowling 
leagues), online communities, and mu-
sical groups (the Postmodern Jukebox 
to the Los Angeles Master Chorale).
The political realm teems with 
dynamically emergent entities: political 
parties, legislative caucuses (such as the 
House Climate Solutions Caucus and 
the House Freedom Caucus), and po-
litical and social advocacy groups and 
movements (such as the ACLU, The 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), 
the Black Lives Matter Global Network, 
and the Southern Policy Law Center), 
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and lobbying associations (such as the 
AARP, the Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturing Association, and 
the National Rifle Association). 
Still other groups include ser-
vice organizations (such as the PTA, 
Planned Parenthood, Doctors without 
Borders, and the League of Women 
Voters), and mutual support and educa-
tional organizations (such as Alcoholics 
anonymous, the American Association 
of Individual Investors, and the Nation-
al Alliance on Mental Illness).
As the preceding suggest, dy-
namically emergent entities play signif-
icant roles in society. 
Dynamically emergent entities 
are autopoietic: they sustain and main-
tain themselves from within. They must 
be open systems. Some are well-estab-
lished; others are evanescent. 
Dynamically emergent entity 
tend to be relatively easy to initiate but 
more difficult to sustain. Consider bi-
ological reproduction, establishing a 
successful business, or building a social 
movement. The creation step is almost 
always easier than maintenance.
Its protean nature explains how 
dynamic emergence adds complexity 
to complex systems. But as with static 
emergence, I see no benefit in applying 
the term emergence to these processes.
4.6  Adaptive Emergence
Adaptive emergence refers to modified 
or new properties or patterns of be-
havior that develop either in response 
to features of the physical, social, eco-
nomic, or political environment, or 
sometimes simply as a continuation 
of ongoing processes, e.g., advances in 
science. Adaptive emergent properties 
and patterns are frequently fitness-en-
hancing in that they often increase the 
relative fitness—or perceived relative 
fitness—of the entities that adopt or de-
velop them. 
Climate change is a non-biolog-
ical example of adaptive emergence. It 
consists of recognizable patterns of me-
teorological changes that have arisen in 
response to changes in the earth’s sur-
face and atmosphere. Climate change 
does not enhance the “fitness” of the 
climate. 
Biological evolution, on scales 
from bacteria to the largest organisms, 
both rapid and long term, illustrates 
quintessential adaptive emergence. Bi-
ological evolution reflects changes in 
form and behavior that enhance fitness. 
Important as static and dynam-
ic emergence are, adaptive emergence 
may represent the most powerful of 
the three categories. It is about change. 
Here is how I would compare the three.
•	 Static emergence focusses on fixed, 
stable, and typically purely physi-
cal entities. To the extent that they 
can be considered systems at all, the 
products of static emergence are 
closed systems at equilibrium. Even 
in our example of the production 
of glucose through photosynthe-
sis, the product, glucose, is a static 
entity at equilibrium. To release its 
energy requires the addition of acti-
vation energy.
•	 Dynamic emergence focusses on en-
tities that must continually renew 
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themselves. Entities based on dy-
namic emergence are open systems 
and must continually find and im-
port energy and other resources. 
Dynamically emergent entities can 
often be understood as agents. They 
interact with each other and with 
the environment. 
•	 Adaptive emergence is probably the 
most important category from a 
societal perspective. Policy makers 
respond continually to newly emer-
gent properties and patterns of be-
havior. At the same time, they must 
avoid policies that will produce un-
wanted adaptations. 
The rest of this section sketches 
a few examples of adaptive emergence.
Unintended consequences: us-
ing the structure and processes of so-
ciety for unintended purposes. One of 
the most widely discussed categories 
of adaptive emergence is that of unin-
tended consequences. Unintended con-
sequences occur when people or orga-
nizations respond to a public policy in 
unanticipated ways. The response typ-
ically helps the person or organization 
but fails to further—and sometimes 
even foils—the policy goals. 
Freakonomics radio (2012) de-
voted a show to three examples of unin-
tended consequences. 
Cobras in Dehli. To rid Delhi of 
cobras during the British occu-
pation, the governor offered a 
bounty. In response, the citizens 
of Delhi started cobra farms. So, 
the government ended the boun-
ty, and the farmers released their 
cobras—producing a cobra prob-
lem much worse than the original.
Rats in Hanoi. There is a similar 
story about rats in Hanoi. The 
French offered a bounty for rat 
tails. People started rat farms, cut 
off the tails, and traded them to 
the government for the bounty.
Pigs in Ft Benning. Ft. Benning 
was plagued with feral pigs. The 
authorities offered to pay for 
pig tails. Residents bought pig 
tails from slaughterhouses or pig 
farmers. 
In all three cases, a mechanism 
intended to solve a problem was ex-
ploited for other purposes.
Birth tourism illustrates how 
people exploit what they see as loop-
holes in the law. To take advantage of 
the law that grants citizenship to any-
one born in the US or Canada, non-cit-
izen pregnant women arrange to give 
birth in one of these countries. 
Saipan has become a popular US 
destination. To encourage tourism, the 
government supported a 2009 change 
in immigration policy that allows Chi-
nese citizens to enter the US visa free 
for up to 45 days, more than enough 
time to have a baby (see Emont, 2017; 
Mullaney, 2018).
Miami has become a birth-tour-
ism destination for Russians (McFad-
den, Fitzpatrick, Connor and Schecter, 
2018).
Vancouver is the favored Cana-
dian destination. Non-resident moth-
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ers now account for nearly 20% of all 
births at Richmond Hospital in British 
Columbia. See Young (2018) for details.
Tax avoidance schemes also fit 
into this category. 
To SWAT is to make a false report 
of a crime in progress as a way to lure 
a police SWAT team to the home of an 
adversary (Jaffe, 2016). In a recent inci-
dent (Criss, Hassan, & Stapleton, 2017), 
a SWAT team killed a civilian who had 
innocently moved his hands toward his 
waist after answering the door for an 
unexpected SWAT team visit. 
In the preceding examples, peo-
ple took advantage of government-es-
tablished structures and processes. The 
following examples represent more or-
ganically emergent phenomena. 
Live streaming of video games. 
The most popular platform is Twitch. 
On average one million people are 
watching Twitch streams at any mo-
ment (Herrman, 2018). 
There are two ways to look at 
Twitch. One is that it’s people play- 
ing video games and other people 
watching. The other is that you 
are playing a game while some-
one sits on the couch. There’s a 
level of interaction that’s just not 
there in standard media. —Clark 
(2017)
Players and viewers talk to each 
other and feel part of a relatively inti-
mate group. 
Open source software. Although 
not a new phenomenon, open source 
software continues to propel change. 
Personal live streaming took off with 
the development of Open Broadcast-
er Software (OBS) (https://obsproject.
com/). Anyone can download it and 
start live-streaming. 
Last mile and flexible local 
transportation. Local transportation 
is an ongoing urban issue. Attempts to 
address it include MicroTransit (Vock, 
2017), bike sharing, Uber/Lyft, and oth-
ers. Electric scooter sharing companies 
have recently sprung up nationwide.
Universal Basic Income (UBI). 
The idea is discussed with increasing 
frequency as a way to address both pov-
erty and job loss due to AI and robotics. 
So far there are no significant successful 
trials. In fact, Finland recently discon-
tinued a UBI trial (Olli-Nilsson, 2018). 
But discussions and experimentation 
continues. The Canadian province of 
Ontario is currently running a trial UBI 
program (Bergstein, 2018).
Tracking online activity. Tech-
niques have been developed to track the 
websites people visit and the products 
they consider buying. With this infor-
mation advertisers can place targeted 
ads in ad space they buy in real time as 
people move from one website to an-
other. 
Privacy features are added to 
browsers and apps. In response to 
having their online activity mined for 
advertising opportunities people are 
asking for ways to ensure their privacy. 
Internet companies respond by offering 
features that they say enhance privacy 
and give users more control over what 
information is collected and how it is 
used.
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Meta abstractions. A meta-ab-
straction is a generalizations of simi-
lar advances in related fields. Here are 
three that have emerged in recent years. 
•	 Meta-heuristics (Luke, 2013). Me-
ta-heuristic are a class of general 
computational techniques for solv-
ing optimization problems. They 
include hill climbing, genetic al-
gorithms, ant colony optimization, 
swarm optimization, and others.
•	 Discovery science is the develop-
ment of methods for discovering 
scientific knowledge through ma-
chine learning, data mining, and 
big data analysis. 
•	 Category theory is finding increas-
ingly widespread application. One 
application is Compositionality, 
which studies how parts compose to 
create wholes. It is applied to phys-
ics, natural language processing, 
cognitive science, and game theory.
So-called populist and nation-
alist movements have gained strength 
in many countries around the world. 
The result is often authoritarian gov-
ernments with increasingly powerful 
executives. 
Markets exhibit so many adap-
tive emergent properties that they de-
serve a section for themselves. This sub-
section is just an overview.
Soros (2009) used the term re-
flexivity to refer to markets in which 
participant actions lead other par-
ticipant to develop strategies, which, 
when acted upon, lead to more strat-
egies, more actions, etc. The Santa Fe 
Artificial Stock Market (Arthur, Hol-
land, LeBaron, Palmer, & Tayler, 1997; 
Palmer, Arthur, Holland, LeBaron and 
Tayler, 1994), illustrates how reflexivity 
can produce endogenous bubbles and 
crashes. 
Suppose some automated inves-
tors “discover” a trading forecast 
that says, “A price rise in the last 
k periods is likely to be followed 
by a rise in next.” Suppose also, 
some (perhaps the same) inves-
tors “discover” a trading fore-
casts that says, “If the current 
price is more than y times the 
fundamental earnings value, ex-
pect it to fall.” The first strategy 
causes bubble behavior: If the 
price rises, investors buy—thus 
validating it, which may cause a 
further rise, etc. Eventually this 
drives the price high enough 
to trigger the second strategy. 
Investors sell. The price drops, 
which switches off the upward 
forecasts, causing other investors 
to sell; and a crash ensues. The 
market becomes an ecology of 
continually changing forecasts.
Econophysics is the formal study of 
these and related phenomena. Re-
searchers have established that many 
markets have common statistical prop-
erties, known as stylized facts (see Cont, 
2001). Huber and Sornette (2016) claim 
that “econophysics provides the meth-
ods, concepts, and tools to scientifically 
account for reflexivity.” 
Bubbles are generally considered 
undesirable. But Sornette and Janeway 
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argue that they often serve a useful so-
cietal function. 
Bubbles are one of our most con-
structive collective processes. 
They lead to extraordinary com-
mitment—beyond what would 
be justified by a standard 
cost-benefit analysis.—Sornette 
(2014)
Janeway (2013, 2015) explains why this 
matters.
Speculation has often occurred 
around technological innova-
tions, including canals, railroads, 
electrification, automobiles, 
aviation, computers, and the 
Internet. These bubbles eventual-
ly burst, causing lots of econom-
ic damage. But we still had trains 
after the 1893 crash, we still use 
electricity despite the 1929 crash, 
and we have the Internet, despite 
the dotcom bubble. 
Without the mania of bubbles, un-
proven yet economically revolutionary 
technologies may not attract sufficient 
investment to get off the ground.
As the preceding illustrate, a broad range 
of phenomena might qualify as adaptive 
emergence. They reflect changes that 
may be more or less newsworthy but 
are not considered abnormal. Virtually 
all societal states include features peo-
ple can turn to their advantage. That’s 
how evolution works. It’s not clear that 
applying the term emergence to them as 
a group enhances understanding. An 
exchange from the movie Ratatouille 
(Bird & Pinkava, 2007) sums it up. 
Father: Son, you can’t change 
nature!
Son: Change is nature, dad.
4.7  Binding Forces, Gateways, 
and the Creative Constructionist 
Perspective
Pines (2014) called emergence “A uni-
fying theme for 21st century science.” 
The central task of theoretical 
physics in our time is no longer 
to write down the ultimate equa-
tions, but rather to catalogue and 
understand emergent behavior 
in its many guises, including po-
tentially life itself. [The] physics 
of the 21st century [must] transi-
tion from the science of the past, 
so intimately linked to reduc-
tionism, to the study of complex 
adaptive matter. ...
In the search for an understand-
ing of emergence, Pines recommended 
studying 
emergent collective patterns 
and regularities [which are] 
are the  gateways to emergent 
behavior. 
Pines re-emphasized the impor-
tance of gateways in his 2016 lecture. 
Cataloging and connecting 
these gateways is a first step to-
ward developing a “Physics of 
Emergence” that would encom-
pass quantum, classical, and liv-
ing matter, social, and economic 
behavior. 
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Here I respectfully disagree. I 
doubt that we will uncover a general-
ized physics of emergence. 
As noted much earlier, Aristotle 
knew that the way components are or-
ganized and bound together helps de-
termine the properties of the resulting 
whole. So one very important question 
is: what are nature’s binding forces? But 
we already know the answer. Physics 
and chemistry tell us how to make stat-
ically emergent entities. Dynamically 
emergent entities are held together by 
specialized applications of imported 
energy. The forces are not at issue. It’s 
how the energy is used and how com-
ponents are organized that matters for 
the properties of the whole.
Emergence is not a mysterious 
force or property that appears if things 
are arranged just right. Emergence re-
flects a perspective more than anything 
else. Science is famously analytic: take 
things apart to see how they work. The 
flip side is synthesis: put things togeth-
er to get something new. If science is 
about analysis, technology is about syn-
thesis. Synthesis (technology) depends 
on analysis (science). We wouldn’t have 
mobile phones were it not for a long 
list of scientific discoveries, including 
quantum mechanics (for transistors), 
the theory of electromagnetism (for the 
phone’s computer and the communica-
tion network), optics (for the phone’s 
camera), astrophysics, relativity (for 
GPS), and on and on. The more science 
learns about how nature works, the 
broader the range of forces and materi-
als available to engineers to put togeth-
er in new ways. Emergence is the per-
spective that it is possible to put things 
together to create new things. We do it 
with technology. Nature does it through 
evolution.
Some professions specialize in 
emergence: engineering and computer 
science, of course, but also the creative 
arts and even accounting. Every engi-
neered device and every computer pro-
gram has new properties. So does every 
new song, every new novel, every new 
work of art, and every new tax avoid-
ance scheme. These are all instances of 
adaptive emergence. Emergence is es-
sentially another word for creativity—
with either nature or human beings as 
the creative element. 
Anderson (1972) discussed and 
dismissed what he called the construc-
tionist hypothesis.
The ability to reduce everything 
to simple fundamental laws does 
not imply the ability to start from 
those laws and reconstruct the 
universe.
Applied to software, my field, 
this is undoubtedly true. One can’t un-
derstand a software system consisting 
of millions of lines of code by a simple 
extrapolation of the properties of op-
erations like addition and subtraction. 
Yet software developers do what Ander-
son suggests is not possible: construct 
multi-million-line software systems by 
combining primitive operations. 
How is that possible? Most large 
systems are composed of components: 
libraries, frameworks, modules, etc. 
Each component has both a specifica-
tion—a description of the functional 
capabilities it offers—and an implemen-
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tation—how it works. It has become 
a rule in software design to separate a 
component’s specification from its im-
plementation. This rule allows software 
developers to construct new functional 
capabilities one level at a time. At each 
level one need know only the functions 
the components perform. One need 
not know how the primitive operations 
were put together to create those com-
ponents.
In the case of software, intelligent 
design is necessary to get from com-
ponents at one level to the next high-
er level of functionality. In nature even 
intelligence is not necessary. As (Den-
nett, 2009) said, “competence does not 
require comprehension.” Many kinds of 
animals have hearts, which work more 
or less the same way. Once a heart is 
developed—by trial and error—it can 
serve as a component for many animals. 
This constructionist process works very 
well. See Abbott (2019) for an extended 
discussion.
To give Pines his due, he may 
have had in mind the phenomenon that 
many substances exhibit similar prop-
erties during phase transitions, e.g., 
from gas to liquid. I think this is similar 
to the phenomenon that hearts in dif-
ferent kinds of animals pump blood in 
more or less the same way. 
Consider this computer science 
example. Implement a Turing machine 
using the Game of Life (Rendell, 2002). 
All the results of the theory of comput-
ability suddenly apply. Yet those results 
are not meaningful at the underlying 
Game-of-Life level. But with creativity, 
they can emerge.
Putnam (1975) makes a simi-
lar point—but without using the term 
emergence. He says that the only rea-
sonable way to explain why a square 
peg (with sides of length d) won’t fit 
through a round hole (with diameter d) 
is that
the board [containing the hole] 
is rigid, the peg is rigid, and as 
a matter of geometrical fact, the 
[diameter of the] hole is smaller 
than the [diagonal of the] peg.
In other words, with the creativ-
ity of human minds, the truths of ge-
ometry emerge from the interactions of 
elementary particles.
Abbott (2015) offers a similar 
example. A block of steel sinks in wa-
ter, but when shaped as a bowl it floats. 
Yet punch holes in the bowl and it no 
longer floats. Floating emerges from 
the interaction of water molecules and 
the organized steel molecules. But like 
computability and geometry, it is not 
meaningful at the particle level. 
Adaptive emergence is a creative 
process. I doubt we will find a physics 
that accounts for it.
5. Stigmergy: Communication 
in the Material World
So far we have reviewed the history of complex systems and discussed two important factors: dispropor-
tionate causality and emergence. Two 
other (and related) areas that are cen-
tral to complex systems are networks 
and communication. Both have been 
intensively studied for years. This sec-
Journal on Policy and Complex Systems 
104
tion does not focus directly on either, 
but it does explore a somewhat unusual 
perspective on one of them: commu-
nication. The perspective derives from 
the observation that nearly all commu-
nication involves leaving traces in the 
environment for others to observe.
Grassé (1959) introduced the 
term stigmergy to refer to the phenom-
enon that traces insects leave in an en-
vironment often stimulate actions by 
other insects. For social insects, this 
phenomenon serves a proto-commu-
nication-like function. Although refer-
ring to it as (intentional) communica-
tion strikes me as anthropomorphism, 
stigmergy provides an important means 
to coordinate the activities of multiple 
agents—which makes it directly rele-
vant to complex systems. Ant foraging 
and termite nest building are widely cit-
ed examples. 
This section generalizes the no-
tion of stigmergy to virtually all com-
munication, illustrating how commu-
nication is necessarily a more complex 
process than we assume.
5.1  Stigmergy as a General 
Coordinating Mechanism
Heylighen (2016) cites Wikipedia as an 
example of stigmergy as a coordinating 
mechanism. 
Readers are stimulated to im-
prove and expand the writings 
of previous contributors. In sit-
uations in which subsequent ac-
tions are stimulated by the trace 
left by previous actions, virtually 
all evolved processes that require 
coordination rely at some level 
on stigmergy.
Heylighen also sees stigmergy as 
underlying the “invisible hand” of mar-
kets. After an economic transaction, the 
trade price, if public, serves as a trace 
that stimulates further activity. 
In both Wikipedia and econom-
ic transactions, a common practice is 
to record not only the activity itself but 
also the change it reflects. Consider the 
voluminous history kept about pric-
es and Wikipedia’s history pages. The 
change record itself can serve as an ac-
tion trigger. 
I would extend the reach of stig-
mergy still further. Consider, for ex-
ample, intra-organism communication 
via, say, hormones released into the 
blood stream. The hormones serve as 
a trace one organ leaves, which triggers 
an activity by another. 
As another example, consider 
that when attacked by herbivores the 
damaged plants release volatile chemi-
cals. Insects that prey on the attacking 
herbivores can sense those chemicals 
and follow the trail to their prey. Plants 
may then evolve better targeted chem-
icals, which result in more defenders 
coming to their rescue. The rescuers 
may also evolve more sharply focused 
sensing mechanisms. Inter-species stig-
mergic proto-communication can facil-
itate evolution.
5.2  Communication is Almost 
Never a Non-Stop Journey
Even more generally, news services 
and interview shows reflect stigmer-
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gy. They provide an artificial environ-
ment in which agents can leave traces 
for others to observe. Those who pro-
vide the information—i.e., newsmak-
ers, entertainers, “guests” on interview 
shows, etc.—do so with the intention 
of having those traces observed. These 
media make explicit what had been 
implicit: information may be imprint-
ed on the environment for others to 
observe. Social media such as Face-
book, Twitter, Slack, YouTube, etc. ex-
tend this functionality to the general 
public. 
Finally, I would categorize as 
stigmergic all communication mediat-
ed by mechanisms that allow a physical 
record to be recorded at one time and 
observed at another—any communi-
cation not involving direct physical 
interaction (such as tapping someone 
on the shoulder). Airport travelers de-
cide which way to turn on seeing signs 
pointing to “Baggage claim” or “Termi-
nal C.” 
An important feature of stig-
mergic communication is that what is 
recorded is treated symbolically or pro-
to-symbolically by the observer. This 
enables non-symbols, e.g., insect pher-
omones or volatile plant chemicals, to 
function as proto-symbols, e.g., indica-
tions of a path to food. Human beings 
have extended this process to symbolic 
communication. 
Some environments not only re-
cord traces, they also act on them and 
provide services for users. Email mes-
sages are traces that are created and 
then directed to specific targets. Instant 
messaging systems provide a similar 
service. Shopping websites make it as 
convenient as possible for potential 
customers to create purchase messag-
es to be left for venders. An extraordi-
nary amount of human activity involves 
communicating through stigmergic 
systems.
Even software reflects stigmer-
gy. When a programer writes software, 
she creates traces for a computer to ob-
serve and to act on. This indirection 
makes writing software often surpris-
ingly challenging. It is misleading to 
say that the computer does exactly what 
one tells it to do. It is not like driving a 
car: turn the steering wheel, and the car 
changes direction. When writing soft-
ware, one must be aware that what one 
writes will be read and interpreted by 
another agent, the computer. As in all 
the cases discussed, the actions taken 
by the observer depend on the observ-
er—autonomous causality again—not 
on the programer’s intentions. 
The humble programmer can 
do little more than leave expres-
sions in the path of an oncoming 
computer and hope that when 
the computer encounters them it 
will do as she wishes.
Like fish, which are not aware 
they are swimming in water, we exist 
in a shared information environment. 
We cannot escape leaving traces in our 
environment. As mentioned in the sec-
tion on adaptive emergence, tracking 
systems record the websites we visit and 
the products we examine. We are like 
prey being tracked by predators. We 
would like to make ourselves invisible, 
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but our very existence leaves traces in 
the environment.
We also exploit the fact that the 
environment can record information. 
We record information for others to 
observe—email messages, etc. as men-
tioned above—as well as for our future 
selves. Clark and Chalmers (1998) call 
the latter the extended mind. No one 
remembers telephone numbers; our 
“contacts” lists remember them for us.
One societal consequence is the 
“emergence” of new problems. Many 
people feel overwhelmed by news and 
data. The current US president is an 
expert at manipulating people through 
tweets. Society has never before en-
countered these situations and does not 
know how to respond.
The media that facilitate com-
munication are the original multi-sided 
platforms (e.g., Hagiu & Wright, 2015). 
6. Summary
So, why are complex systems com-plex? We presented a brief history of complex systems from Aristotle 
to the present and found that complexi-
ty has many parents.
•	 To understand a system one must 
understand not only its compo-
nent parts, but also their organiza-
tion and the forces that hold them 
together. 
•	 A system of any complexity must 
be open so that it can draw energy 
and other resources from its envi-
ronment. Such systems are generally 
both stable and far from equilibrium.
•	 Such systems must have means 
(a)  for acquiring those resources, 
(b) for making use of them to main-
tain itself, and (c)  for eliminating 
waste products. 
•	 Far-from-equilibrium systems can 
exist only in an environment of 
available energy. 
•	 Environments with plentiful ener-
gy flows may have critical tipping 
points. 
•	 Systems that depend on energy usu-
ally have means to store and to ac-
cess it. 
•	 Energy storage mechanisms exhib-
it disproportionate causality: more 
energy is released than is required 
to trigger the release. 
•	 Energy storage mechanisms abound 
in both the biosphere and human 
society.
•	 A world of many easily triggered 
energy stores opens itself to cascad-
ing chain reactions.
•	 In a world with symbol processing 
entities—and even proto-symbol 
processing entities—energy can 
be released in response to symbols 
or proto-symbols. This can create 
nearly unboundedly disproportion-
al effects. 
•	 Emergent phenomena may be clas-
sified as static, dynamic, or adap-
tive. All contribute to complexity. 
•	 Given its quasi-mystical baggage, the 
term emergence should be retired.
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•	 Adaptive emergence is a synonym 
for creativity. Nature, without con-
sciousness, and human beings, with 
it, continually create new phenom-
ena, thereby adding complexity to 
the world.
•	 Other than direct contact, commu-
nication is always stigmergic. It is 
mediated by a physical trace, which 
subjects it to misinterpretation, 
to deception, and to third-party 
observation.
•	 Stigmergy encourages the develop-
ment of new environments that en-
able stigmergic communication. If 
a new environment becomes widely 
used it can be very valuable. 
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